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Studies of the linkages between real estate prices and general economic 
conditions have an extensive history, beginning with tabulations suggesting 
the ways in which long swings in construction and price development were 
synchronized with long swings in a ggregate economic activity (Gottlieb, 
1976).  Recent studies have explored the implications of alternative 
representations of investor expectations upon real estate construction and 
the cyclical behavior of housing prices and the rents for non-residential 
properties.  These models trace through the effects upon supplier and 
demander behavior of differing price expectations in the real estate market.  
The earliest models tease out the dynamic paths of housing prices and 
commercial rents which arise from exogenous expectations about the future 
course of prices.  More sophisticated models assume that households and 
firms have adaptive expectations about the future, assuming, for example, 
myopic behavior on the part of economic actors (in which they forecast that 
current conditions or current rates of change will continue into the future).  In 
the most modern formulation of market dynamics, actors are assumed to have 
rational expectations.  That is, in response to unanticipated shocks in the 
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housing or property market, economic actors, on average, are able to predict 
the market response correctly and are able to act upon that knowledge. 
Models such as these are able to generate patterns of price change over time 
in response to varying conditions in economic fundamentals and in economic 
shocks.  (See, for example, DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992, and Case and 
Shiller, 1988).  There has, however, been little or no research on the opposite 
line of causation  -- the effect of changes in property markets upon 
subsequent economic conditions. 
The first part of this paper is focused on the former question –- the linkages 
between economic “fundamentals” and property prices.  It reports on new 
research evaluating empirically the effect of economic conditions upon 
property prices.  In particular, this research includes a detailed comparison of 
the importance of “fundamentals” upon housing prices relative to the 
importance of “history” in affecting outcomes. 
The second part of the paper focuses on the latter question -– the potential 
for a causal role between outcomes in the property market and the 
subsequent health of the overall economy.  This discussion is largely 
speculative and suggestive –- and not based upon any tight theoretical or 
empirical model. 
The first part of the discussion is based upon a detailed body of data from the 
U.S.  The second part of the discussion may be relevant to the economic 
conditions which have faced many Asian economies during the last three 
years.  Specialists in Asian property markets will have far better access to 
data and hypotheses about these specific markets than I.  However, I will 
raise a few questions that deserve more research in the analysis of the current 
fiscal crises in many Asian countries. 
Do Fundamentals Explain Property Price? 
In a celebrated article written about a decade ago, Mankiw and Weil (1989) 
forecast that real house prices in the U.S. would drop by 47 percent by the 
year 2007.  This forecast was based upon the changing demographics in the 
U.S. population (and little else).  T he model assumed the most myopic of 
expectations  -- that market actors did not take into account  today the 
inexorable effect that known changes in demographic conditions would have 
on housing prices tomorrow. The response to this article –- and the recent 
outpouring of research on the topic (see, for example, the special issue of 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1991) -– underscores the lack of 
consensus about the correct approach for forecasting housing price changes.  Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  3 
 
Previous studies vary in both their geographic scope and in their attention to 
the complexity of housing markets.  These studies range from detailed 
analyses of economic fundamentals in the context of aggregate national 
housing price trends (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994) to exploratory research 
applied to specific regions (Case and Mayer, 1995; Clapp and Giaccotto, 1994; 
Dua and Miller, 1996; and Smith and Ho, 1995).  Only a few models that use 
economic fundamentals to explain housing price movements have been 
generalized and applied to explain price movements across local metropolitan 
areas (See Poterba, 1991; Case and Shiller, 1990; and Potepan, 1996, for 
examples). 
During the spring of 1997, Christian Redfearn and I assembled an extensive 
quantitative description of annual economic conditions for some 41 U.S. 
metropolitan areas over a fifteen-year period (Quigley and Redfearn, 1997).  
The measures we gathered include population, employment, income, housing 
starts and permits, vacancy rates, and mortgage activity.  Our analysis 
represents one of the first detailed empirical studies of price determination 
undertaken systematically across major U.S. housing markets. 
The data on local U.S. housing markets were gathered from numerous 
sources.
1  The variables include a local consumer price index, employment 
and income disaggregated by industry category, the number of households 
and total population, vacancy rates for owner occupied housing, commercial 
offices, and rental housing, unemployment rates, the volume of mortgage 
lending for purchase and for refinance, and the volume of housing sales. 
Table 1 reports a summary of the course of prices for owner-occupied, single-
detached housing in the 41 metropolitan areas during a recent nine-year 
period. As indicated in the table, U.S. housing markets vary enormously in the 
rate of price increase and in the volatility of housing prices.  The rather 
stagnant markets of Providence and Pittsburgh stand in contrast with the 
volatile Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland housing markets. Table 2 reports 
the average characteristics of local economic “fundamentals” during the 1986-
94 period for these metropolitan areas. As noted in the table, the average 
annual change in housing prices was 2.5 percent, but the variance was five 
times as large. 
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the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, as well as private sources, such as the National Association 
of Realtors, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Most of the variables are reported by MSA, 
although several are only available at the state level. 4  Quigley 
   
Table 1  Average Housing Prices and Price Volatility for U.S. Metroplitan 







Atlanta  108.44  5.57 
Baltimore  127.90  12.98 
Boston  106.61  6.03 
Charlotte  119.19  16.87 
Chicago  136.91  22.20 
Cincinnati  132.44  18.74 
Cleveland  124.99  16.74 
Denver  108.27  16.97 
Detroit  142.54  25.93 
Hartford  104.79  7.82 
Honolulu  126.76  12.62 
Indianapolis  132.88  15.75 
Jacksonville  106.52  3.72 
Kansas City  128.74  14.18 
Los Angeles  137.41  23.02 
Miami  111.37  9.44 
Milwaukee  130.65  19.99 
Minneapolis-St. Paul  114.61  8.15 
Nashville  111.34  10.90 
New Orleans  99.87  8.23 
New York  113.42  6.96 
Oakland  140.42  19.98 
Orlando  109.31  5.15 
Philadelphia  134.30  13.57 
Phoenix  101.16  5.70 
Pittsburgh  104.73  5.19 
Portland  150.23  44.32 
Providence  94.65  3.98 
Provo  132.11  27.41 
Riverside  125.60  16.30 
Sacramento  136.58  22.93 
St. Louis  121.63  11.25 
Salt Lake City  144.66  41.36 
San Diego  132.25  17.15 
San Francisco  148.51  22.65 
San Jose  152.16  25.00 
Seattle  148.25  32.34 
Springfield  106.23  7.35 
Tampa  106.70  4.15 Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  5 
 
Washington, DC  130.69  13.75 
Wilmington  128.80  12.49 
 
Table 2  Average Characteristics of Local Economic Variables and                
Housing Prices for 41 U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1986-1994 
Variable  Average  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Residential Construction 
Permits (thousands per year) 
12.15  9.52  7.97  5.22 
Housing Starts (thousands per 
year) 
18.84  12.09  2.10  66.90 
Households (thousands)  944.75  745.56  31.98  3298.72 
Total Population (thousands)  2500.25  2067.79  264.61  9138.79 
Owner-Occupied Vacancy Rate 
(percent) 
1.58  0.81  0.10  4.60 
Pental Vacancy Rate (percent)  7.32  2.74  2.00  16.50 
Income (millions of current 
dollars) 
41.86  36.98  10.48  187.01 
Employment (thousands)  1238.58  913.21  414.66  4274.94 
Log Housing Price  4.91  0.20  4.42  5.31 
Annual Change in Housing Price 
(percent) 
2.50  5.78  -11.93  27.37 
 
The basic notion that prices in competitive markets are determined by the 
intersection of supply and demand can be represented by 
Pit = f(Qit
d, Qit
s),   (1) 
Where Pit represents housing prices in MSA i at time t, and Qit
d and Qit
s are the 
quantities of housing that are demanded and supplied, respectively, in MSA i 
at time t.  The supply and demand for housing are characterized by 
Qit
d = d(Pit, INCit, Xit) , and  (2) 
Qit
s = s(Pit, VACANCYit, Yit)  (3) 
Housing demand at time t in any market i is a function of housing prices and 
income (INC) and a vector of exogenous variables X.  Demand is an 
increasing function of income and a decreasing function of price.  Similarly, 
housing supply is a function of prices and vacancies (VACANCY) as well as a 6  Quigley 
   
set of exogenous variables Y.  Presumably, housing supply is an increasing 
function of prices and a decreasing function of vacancies; demand increases 
with income and declines with price. 
Theory provides less guidance about the exogenous variables, X and Y, in 
equations (1) and (2).  Clearly, aggregate demand also depends upon the size 
of the market, which we characterize by the number of households or the total 
population (referred to below as POP) and by aggregate employment (EMP).  
Presumably, housing supply in any period depends upon construction 
activity, which we measure as the number of residential construction permits 
or by the number of housing starts (CONST).  Finally, we expect adjustment 
to changes in prices to be slow, given the lead times in construction and 
conversion and the delayed mobility response to price changes.  Together, 
these factors suggest that supply and demand may be represented by  
Qit
d = d(L[Pit], INCit, POPit, EMPit) , and  (4) 
Qit
s = s(L[Pit], VACANCYit, CONSTit)  (5) 
Where L[ ] is the lag operator. 
Substituting (4) and (5) into (1) and solving for Pit yields 
Pit = P(POPit, INCit, EMPit, CONSTit, VACANCYit, L[Pit]) (6) 
For those 41 U.S. housing markets we estimated equation (6) in a variety of 
specifications and forms, including logarithmic models and percentage 
change models. In the former specification, all variables are expressed as 
natural logarithms, while in the latter specification, all variables are expressed 
as percentage changes.  In logarithmic form the dependent variable is 
interpreted as the instantaneous percentage change (dP/P), while in the latter 
form, the dependent variable is the one-period percentage change (DP/P).  For 
each specification, we investigated a variety of models without lagged 
adjustment and also models with one- and two-period lags.
2 
Table 3 reports several basic regression models relating changes in economic 
fundamentals to log housing prices.  Model I includes only household 
income; the results suggest that a ten percent increase in household income 
is associated with a two percent increase in the price of owner-occupied 
housing.  When construction permits are added, the results indicate that 
                                                 
2 In the text, we report only the results of the logarithmic models.  The percentage 
change models, summarized in Figure 2, are consistent with the results obtained from the 
logarithmic models. Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  7 
 
construction activity is higher in metropolitan areas with higher housing 
prices.  As expected, prices are lower in regions with higher vacancy rates.  
They are also higher in larger metropolitan areas, as measured by the number 
of households.  The most complete specification explains about 29 percent of 
the variation in log housing prices.  The coefficients appear to be reasonable.  
Overall, the results are supportive of the importance of local economic 
conditions in affecting housing prices. 
Table 3  Models of Housing price Development Based on Economic 
Fundamentals All Variables in Logarithms  
(t ratios in parentheses) 
      Model     
Variable  I  II  III  IV  V 










Construction Permits    0.064 
(3.43) 
    0.011 
(0.56) 
Owner-Occupied Vacancy Rate      -0.093 
(4.06) 
  -0.098 
(4.54) 















2  0.108  0.154  0.171  0.217  0.289 
Note :  Regressions are based upon 259 observations on housing prices, 1986-1994, in 
41 U.S. metropolitan areas. 
 
Table 4 presents an alternative perspective.  It indicates the results of models 
which predict housing prices solely on the basis of past prices.  Prices today 
are closely related to prices last year.  The strong autocorrelation in prices 
and price changes is consistent with prior research (e.g. Case and Shiller, 
1989).  Most of the variation in log prices can be predicted by previous price 
movements.  A one- and  two-period lag explains more than 96 percent of the 
variation. 
Tables 5 combines this autoregressive structure with economic fundamentals.  
It reports five regression models which explain log housing prices in the 41 
metropolitan areas in the sample.  Each model includes a one- and two-period 8  Quigley 
   
lag in price changes.  The one- and two-period lags are significant in all 
formulations.  However, local economic conditions  –- as measured by 
changes in employment, income, in the number of households, and in the 
number of construction permits -– are important determinants of the course of 
housing prices. 
 
Table 4  Models of Housing Price Development Based on Lagged Dependent 
Variables  









P(t-1)  0.973 
(58.34) 
  1.596 
(37.39) 















Table 5  Combined Models of Housing Price Development  
All Variables in Logarithms (t-ratios in parentheses) 
      Model     
Variable  IX  X  XI  XII  XIII 






























Construction Permits    0.014 
(3.38) 




    -0.030 
(6.08) 
  -0.029 
(5.97) 
Number of households        -0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.008 
(1.62) Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  9 
 















Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the implications of these models. Figure 1 is based 
upon the logarithmic models reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Figure 1  Implications of “History” And “Economic Fundamentals” in 
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upon analogous linear models not reported in the tables.  Each figure 
presents the observed course of housing prices and the prices predicted by 
one of the statistical models.  The top panel of Figure 1 compares the actual 
course of housing prices with those predicted by Model VIII which is based 
only upon the previous course of housing prices.  The bottom panel is based 
upon Model XIII which includes economic fundamentals as well as lagged 
values of housing prices.  The figure illustrates the improvement in 
forecasting when fundamentals are also used to predict housing prices. 
This improvement is even more apparent in Figure 2 based upon the linear 
models.  This difference arises because, in the linear form, history by itself 
explains less of the variation in current housing prices (in linear form, the 
explained variance comparable to that reported in Table 4 ranges from 9 to 34 
percent instead of 76 to 96 percent). 
Of particular concern is the ability of a model to predict turning points, the 
specific periods in which price declines reverse and when “bubbles” burst.  
Table 6 summarizes the accuracy of the various models in predicting turning 
points.  43 turning points were observed in the sample data.  For both the 
price change models and the logarithmic models reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5, 
lagged prices form credible predictors of turning points.  However, the 
number of correctly and incorrectly predicted turning points is improved by 
combining data on local conditions with housing price histories.  This 
statistical analysis suggests quite clearly that economic fundamentals are 
important determinants of the course of housing prices, and they are Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  11 
 
important in predicting the turning points in housing price trends.  However, 
the data also show –- quite emphatically -- that fundamentals alone leave a lot 
unexplained.  A simple model of economic fundamentals explains between 10 
and 40 percent of the changes in housing prices.  When fundamentals are 
augmented by lags in housing prices, the explained variance increases.  But 
the augmented models still do not explain the bursting of asset “bubbles” 
very well.  About half of the sign reversals in price trends are predicted by the 
economic models. 
 
Figure 2  Implications of “History” And “Economic Fundamentals” in 
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A.  Models Based on the Log of Housing Prices 
V  52  13  39 
VII  63  27  36 
VIII  55  26  29 
B.  Models Based on the Percent Change in Housing Prices 
V  43  19  24 
VII  42  16  26 
VIII  47  21  26 
* Note :  A turning point is defined as a reversal of sign in house price changes in adjacent 
years.  There are 43 turning points in the raw data. 
Do Property Price Trends Explain Fundamentals? 
Bubbles in financial markets and in real asset markets are not new  –- as 
historians of Holland in the 17
th century and as real estate developers in Texas 
in the 1980’s can attest.  Garber (1990) reviews a diverse set of historically 
interesting speculations  -– runups and subsequent crashes in prices  –- 
suggesting five ways in which investor behavior can lead to a bubble in asset 
prices which subsequently bursts.  The first and most straightforward of his 
examples is that of a single investor who incorrectly (or falsely) claims that a 
venture will pay great future dividends.  Subsequent investors base their 
decisions upon their perceptions of market fundamentals.  A situation of 
asymmetric information in which one player has an incentive to dissemble 
may yield a runup in asset prices if this player is successful. 
The incentives and opportunities to engage in this behavior in real capital 
markets may have been unusually strong in Asia in the mid-1990’s.  First, with 
robust export demand, firms had  incentives to increase leverage and borrow 
against assets for expansion.  Second, existing real capital assets are 
notoriously hard to value.  Markets are thin, and the problems of appraisal 
and valuation are great.  Markets are unusually thin, perhaps, in Asian real 
estate since many countries (for example, Korea), made it quite difficult for 
foreign entities to invest in real capital.  Indeed, it was not until the middle of 14  Quigley 
   
1998 that Thai citizens married to foreigners could own real property. Third, it 
is alleged that patterns of asset ownership and routine business transactions 
among élites (aka “crony capitalists”) made it easy to increase property 
assessments and thus to gain greater leverage by mortgaging properties at 
higher prices.  The proceeds of these transactions could be invested in new 
business as well as expansions in the current line of business. 
Developers, anxious to fuel the general expansion of the economy, applied for 
construction loans, bridge loans, takeout financing.  If the lending 
institutions operated under an implicit guarantee  –- the way lending 
institutions in Texas were allowed to operate in the 1980’s –- then it follows 
that investment in real property was excessive and the potential for default on 
loans was increased.  Rational lending institutions had every incentive to 
undertake excessively risky real capital investments. 
Under these conditions the diagnosis of a “ currency crisis” could arise 
without any of the macroeconomic conditions that normally lead to such 
crises.  The inevitable “bad luck” that follows from the moral hazard facing 
lending institutions could place them in a position of defaulting on the loans 
they obtained from world capital markets.  The financial consequences of 
these defaults would have to be made up by central government, but foreign 
capital would also be withdrawn.  Existing firms with excessive loans on their 
plant and equipment would be squeezed, and the bubble could simply burst.  
Contagion could quickly lead the economy from one equilibrium to another 
disastrous equilibrium. 
There seems to be no formal model of this alternative to a “currency crisis” 
model of the Asian financial crisis  (although Paul Krugman [1998] has 
sketched out a couple of these issues on his website).
3  I have not conducted 
any empirical analyses of this issue.  However, there are four facts which may 
make the explanation more plausible. 
First, the ratio of new office supply to historical supply and to historical 
vacancy rates was astonishingly high in Asia by the mid-1990’s.  Figures 3 
and 4 show this imbalance quite dramatically, reporting the supply in Kuala 
Lumpur and the Klang Valley in Malaysia. 
Figure 3 presents condominium demand, supplies and vacancy rates in the 
Klang Valley.  As reported in the figure, vacancy rates were already forecast 
to quadruple between 1996 and 1999, a period in which supply was also 
                                                 
3 More recently, Edison, et al. (1998) have presented a model containing elements of this 
line of reasoning. Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  15 
 
forecast to increase substantially.  As shown in Figure 4, available space in 
office buildings in Kuala Lumpur was forecast to increase by more than 5 
million square feet in 1997, more than twice the growth in any other year in the 
preceding decade. 
Figure 3  Supply, Demand, and Vacancy Rates in Klang Valley 
Condomimium Market (estimates by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
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Source: Jones Lang Wootton 
E = Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Research Estimates 
 
Figures 5 and 6 present more detail on this imbalance in two other Asian 
markets.  In Jakarta, office vacancies were about 14 percent in 1996, yet 13 
million square feet of additional construction was forecast for 1997-1999.  In 
the Bangkok CBD, office vacancy rates were about 15 percent while the 
largest increment ever in new office supply was forecast for 1998.  Note that 
all this information was available to investors in early 1997.  
Second, the ratio of sale prices to market rents for commercial and for 
residential real estate was at historic highs well before the Asian crash of 1997.  
Figure 7 reports these trends for Hong Kong retail properties while Figure 8 
reports trends for Hong Kong office rents.  In both markets, prices diverged 
from rents  – in an upward direction in 1996 and were forecast to  
 16  Quigley 
   
Figure 4  Supply, Demand, and Vacancy Rates in Kuala Lumpur Office 
Market (estimates by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter in January 
1997) 
 
Source: Derived from Janes Land Wootton   E = Estimates 
 
Increase even more in 1997.  Office rents in Singapore, shown in Figure 9 
exhibited a similar trend.  Rents for prime condominiums in Jakarta were quite 
flat from 1995 onwards as indicated in Figure 10.  Yet sale prices were forecast 
to increase by forty percent between 1995 and 1997.  Again, this information 
was known to property investors in early 1997.  
Third, apparently the depositors in the financial institutions which behaved 
recklessly were, ex post, protected from loss in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia 
-– suggesting that they may have acted on this belief ex ante. 
Fourth, the bubble in property markets burst w ell before the rest of the 
dominoes fell –- and before the apparent “currency crisis” developed.  For 
example, Samprasong Land missed payments on scheduled foreign debt in 
February 1997, five months before the subsequent devaluation of the bhat.  
During the intervening period, the Thai government ploughed some $8B U.S. 
in propping up distressed financial intermediaries. Real Estate Prices and Economic Cycles  17 
 
Figure 5: Supply, Demand, and Vacancy Rates in Jakarta Office Market 





















Supply (Mil Sq Ft) Vacancy
 
Source: Derived from Jones Land Wootton   E = Estimates 
 
Figure 6: Supply, Demand, and Vacancy Rates in Bangkok CDB Office 























Source: Derived from Jones Land Wootton   E = Estimates 18  Quigley 
   
Figure 7  Course of Rents and Selling Prices in Hong Kong Retail Market 












Source: Jones Land Wootton, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Research 
 
Figure 8  Course of Rents and Selling Prices in Hong Kong Office Market 
















Source: Jones Land Wootton, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Research 
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Figure 9  Course of Rents and Selling Prices in Singapore Office Market 
(estimates by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter in March, 1997) 
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority 
 
Figure 10: Course of Rents and Selling Prices in Jakarta Condominium 


















Source: Jones Land Wootton, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Research 20  Quigley 
   
Conclusion 
In this paper I have concentrated on two aspects of real estate and the course 
of the real economy.  Are real estate trends predictable by fundamental factors 
in the economy?  Can exogenous trends in real estate prices –- really bubbles 
in this market -– affect economic fundamentals? 
I hope I have convinced you of the first -– although it seems clear economic 
fundamentals do not explain most of the variation in the property prices in the 
short run. 
With regard to the second, I hope to have provoked additional thought and 
controversy.  It seems likely that bubbles in Asian property markets had real 
consequences for the course of national and regional economic conditions 
during the late 1990’s. 
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